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OUR FORGOTTEN COLONY:
PUERTO RICO AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
By LeeAnn O’Neill and Jennifer Gumbrewicz, Esq.*
Inter arma silent leges—in time of war, the laws are silent1

I

n a time where the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism
dominates the front page news, the War on Drugs has been
relegated to a second class position. However, for decades,
the War on Drugs has silently “hunted” minorities, sending them
to jails in disproportionate numbers and infringing on their Constitutional rights. Despite the nation’s new focus in the Middle
East, the effects of the War on Drugs are still as devastating as
when it began. A “country of minorities,” Puerto Rico is not only
a prime target of the War on Drugs, it is also a key drug portal to
the U.S. and the Caribbean and the rates of crime and drug addiction are among the highest in the world.2 The War on Drugs
in Puerto Rico has created an inner city ghetto in a beautiful
tropical paradise.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUERTO RICO
The contentious relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico creates a complicated background for the War on
Drugs. The United States acquired Puerto Rico as a colony from
Spain through the Treaty of Paris in 1899. In 1900, the Foraker
Act allowed Puerto Rico to establish a civil government. The
Jones Act followed in 1917, wherein Congress granted Puerto
Ricans “statutory citizenship.”3 Although this technically granted
U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, the rights of a statutory citizen
are different than those of a constitutional citizen. In 1950, Public Law 600 gave Puerto Rico the right to adopt its own constitution and establish a relationship with the United States via a
compact.4 Just two years later, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico was established under its own constitution.5 Despite several
status referendums, Puerto Rico still has a nebulous position as
an unincorporated U.S. territory – somewhere in between a colony and a state.6 The status debate alone is fraught with constitutional and self-determination issues that cannot even begin to be
explored in this article.7
This quasi-state, quasi-territory status creates tensions between Puerto Rico and the federal government. Congress and the
Supreme Court wield the ultimate authority as to which constitutional provisions apply to Puerto Rico and whether or not federal
law preempts local law on the island.8 This treatment, however,
has been extremely inconsistent. For example, in Examining
Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. de Otero, the
Supreme Court held that the District Court of Puerto Rico was
obligated to enforce the federal civil rights statute to protect
rights secured by the Constitution.9 Just a year later, in Harris v.
Rosario, the Court held that rights invoked under the Equal Protection Clause did not have to be protected because “Congress,
which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitu8

tion… may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as
there is a rational basis for its actions.”10 Equally controversial is
the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, which states that the
statutory laws of the United States apply equally in Puerto Rico
as in the rest of the United States unless “locally inapplicable.”11
The Act also provides the Supreme Court with discretion to determine what the U.S. government deems “locally inapplicable.”12

THE WAR ON DRUGS
In the early half of the 20th century, a number of federal
drug laws passed through Congress criminalizing drug use.13 The
Nixon administration first coined the phrase “War on Drugs.”14
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 centralized the piecemeal federal legislation involving the
prohibition and regulation of illicit drugs.15 The Act “classifies
substances… into five categories of controlled substances…
[and]… criminalizes manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, and
possessing controlled substances in violation of the Act’s comprehensive regulatory scheme.”16 The Reagan administration
escalated the War on Drugs by passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.17 The Act “increased penalties and instituted mandatory
minimum sentences for most drug offenses.”18 The 1980s
brought a massive increase in the number of drug cases brought
to federal courts. “While the overall rate of criminal cases filed
in the United States district courts rose sixty-nine percent [from
1980 to 1990], the number of drug cases increased nearly three
hundred percent.”19
The War on Drugs is primarily adjudicated in the federal
criminal justice system. Given the transient nature of drug smuggling, which crosses not only national but international borders,
only the federal government has the proper jurisdiction and
enough resources to combat this problem.20
The main U.S. suppliers of cocaine are South and Central
American countries. Texas, Florida, California, Puerto Rico and
New York consistently lead the country in total cocaine seizures.21 Their positions as border states make them ideal for drug
trafficking due to access via numerous waterways and infrastructures designed to distribute drugs to large markets.

THE WAR ON DRUGS—DRUG EXCEPTIONALISM
The courts tend to view the War on Drugs in a favorable
manner, often giving more leeway to law enforcement officers
investigating drug related crimes, and analyzing drug cases using
more flexible standards, such as “reasonableness.”22 This concept of viewing the War on Drugs favorably is best described as
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“drug exceptionalism” and is explained by Erik Luna in his article entitled, “Symposium: New Voices on the War on Drugs:
Drug Exceptionalism.”23 His argument introduces the proposition that constitutional criminal procedure should be applied the
same no matter the crime.24 However, many legal scholars note
that, in reality, courts make exceptions in drug cases.25 Primarily
in the context of Fourth Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court has found that probable cause is not always necessary in a
number of drug related seizures.26 Additionally, in light of the
so-called “border exception,” the Supreme Court has decreased
the legal protections normally applied for searches, seizures,
and detentions that occur near the U.S. borders.27

THE WAR ON MINORITIES
The escalation in drug enforcement dramatically affects
minority communities, particularly the African American and
Latino communities. The rates of incarceration for minorities are
significantly higher than those for Caucasians.28 Consequently,
minorities are overrepresented in the federal prison system in
relation to their representation in the overall population.
Two major reasons for higher rates of incarceration for minorities involved in drug related offenses are the drug laws
themselves and the nature of their enforcement. First, the laws
are more likely to be enforced against minorities. Presumably, in
an effort to catch more drug offenders, the police are more likely
to patrol inner city streets where people are outside in plain view
rather than the suburban neighborhoods where much of the drug
activity occurs behind closed doors. Not only are there higher
rates of patrol in areas where drug use is concentrated, but race
is also considered one of a list of legal and acceptable factors
law enforcement uses in routine traffic stops and drug courier
profiles.29 Most drug courier profiles from various law enforcement agencies include characteristics such as the destination or
city of origin, nervousness, at what point a person deplanes, and
race.30 Race can also be used as a factor in other brief detentions
by law enforcement.31
Second, the laws target the minority population. While on
their face the laws seem to be racially neutral, they are not racially neutral in their application. (See Table I below). For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have the same sentence for 500 grams of powder cocaine and 5 grams of crack
cocaine.32 On its face, this crack/cocaine disparity in sentencing
does not seem to be a racial issue; however, powder cocaine is
generally used by a predominantly suburban, upper class, white
population and crack cocaine is used predominately by an urban
and minority population.33
Table I – All Offenders Sentenced in 1989
Pre-Guidelines
Guidelines
Total
16,027 (100%)
21,057 (100%)
White
10,618 (66.3%)
9,372 (44.5%)
Black
3,580 (22.3%)
5,523 (26.2%)
Hispanic 1,265 (8.5%)
5,538 (26.3%)
Source: Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to
Disparity. 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 204-208 (1991)
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DRUG TRAFFICKING IN PUERTO RICO
Central and South American drug traffickers have used
Puerto Rico as a portal to the U.S. because of the diminished
border scrutiny in that area, allowing for an easier exchange of
people and goods from Puerto Rico to the United States.34 “An
important incentive for the traffickers in reaching Puerto Rico is
the possibility that illicit drugs can be transported to the continental United States in cargo that is not subject to further inspection by [Customs and Border Patrol]. Puerto Rico also is an attractive sea and air transportation site in the Caribbean because
the island has one of the busiest seaports in North America, and
an abundance of commercial flights to the United States.”35 In
1995, Puerto Rico was designated as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), which prompted the Drug Enforcement
Agency to direct more resources to Puerto Rico.36

THE WAR ON DRUGS AS A WAR ON PUERTO RICO
The Federal District Court of Puerto Rico plays a central
role in the War on Drugs because approximately 68% of federally sentenced defendants in Puerto Rico are drug offenders.37
Unlike other high drug offense jurisdictions, Puerto Rico is the
only one that is a “state” of minorities.38 Coupled with Puerto
Rico’s tenuous status as a “commonwealth” with its citizen’s
rights dictated by Congress and the Supreme Court and not by
the United States Constitution, the War on Drugs has transformed into a war on Puerto Rico. Furthermore, it is important
to note that the uncertainty of Puerto Rico’s status magnifies the
effects of the War on Drugs as a war on minorities. In addition
to the traditional inherent racial bias of the War on Drugs discussed above, the United States justifies trampling on the rights
of Puerto Ricans as an extension of the War on Drugs. The government’s violation of the right to a jury trial and due process,
its application of the death penalty, and drug exceptionalism are
just a few issues highlighted by the War on Drugs in Puerto
Rico.

RIGHTS IN A WAR ZONE
Since Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory, not all of
the fundamental rights granted by the U.S. Constitution are
granted to the citizens of Puerto Rico. Unlike states, Puerto Rico
cannot incorporate these rights through the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Arguably, the biggest exclusion is the right to jury
trial.40 Although Puerto Rico is constitutionally protected under
the due process clause,41 the U.S. Constitution does not grant
Puerto Rico the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial because it is not deemed to be a fundamental constitutional
right.42 The implication is a devastating psychological injury to
Puerto Rico. The logic of the court stigmatizes Puerto Ricans as
second class U.S. citizens – they are not “good enough” to be
afforded the right to jury trial, which was deemed a fundamental
right in Duncan v. Louisiana43 and is twice guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution.44 However, the local constitution of Puerto
Rico grants a right to jury trial for felonies in lieu of the U.S.
9

citizens who are denied the right to participate directly or indiConstitution.45
To add insult to injury, federal courts in Puerto Rico require rectly in the government that enacts and authorizes the imposijurors to be proficient in English because the “overwhelming tion of such punishment.”52 In 1988, the Drug Kingpin Statute
national interest served by the use of English in a United States allowed federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty for murcourt… justifies conducting proceedders that occur during the course of a
ings in the District of Puerto Rico in
drug-kingpin conspiracy.53 More notaEnglish and requiring jurors to be pro- Unlike states, Puerto Rico cannot
bly, the Federal Death Penalty Act
ficient in that language,” and therefore
(FDPA) of 1994 allowed the death
incorporate these rights through
precludes alternatives like simultanepenalty to be sought for the running of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
ous translation.46 If the Sixth Amenda large-scale drug enterprise.54 The
ment applied in Puerto Rico, the lan- Arguably, the biggest exclusion is
First Circuit Court of Appeals in
guage qualification would clearly vioUnited States v. Acosta-Martinez,55 a
the right to jury trial
late the Amendment because it guarcase where the U.S. Attorney pursued
antees the right of the accused to have
the death penalty for a murder coma jury composed from a cross section of his community.47 It is mitted during a drug offense, overturned a successful challenge
nearly impossible to find such a jury that meets the language to the enforcement of the death penalty in the district court of
proficiency because 71.9% of Puerto Ricans are not proficient in Puerto Rico.56 Many jurors were excluded from the AcostaEnglish.48 Consequently, juries consist of an English-speaking Martinez jury pool because of their anti-death penalty sentielite and thus systematically excludes the Spanish-speaking ments.57 Thus, it should come as no surprise then that the U.S.
population.
Attorneys in Puerto Rico have submitted the largest number of
The federal government has also preempted local law with potential capital cases for review than any of the other 94 federal
federal statutes to facilitate the War on Drugs. For example, the judicial districts, making Puerto Ricans subject to more federal
First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Quinones held prosecutions than other jurisdictions.58
that the Omnibus Crime Control Act, which regulates the use of
CONCLUSION
wiretap evidence, preempts the Puerto Rican constitutional ban
49
against such evidence. Authorizing wiretapped evidence, deAs second-class citizens with diminished constitutional
spite a local constitutional ban against it, violates the rights of rights, Puerto Ricans have been further disenfranchised by the
Puerto Rico’s citizens. Considering that 78% of court-authorized War on Drugs. We have seen that in times of war, including the
wiretaps are used for narcotics-related crime investigations, it is War on Drugs, certain fundamental rights are pushed to the side.
clear that the local rights of Puerto Rico’s citizens are not taken In the case of Puerto Rico, the War on Drugs has affected cervery seriously by the federal government or by the judicial sys- tain fundamental rights with regards to life, fair trials and pritem.50 More grievous than the federal government’s preemption vacy. The U.S. government has become the distant slumlord of
with regard to wiretapping is the federal government’s disregard the fundamental rights of Puerto Rico’s citizens. The U.S.
of Puerto Rico’s constitutional ban against the death penalty. 51
should learn a valuable lesson with regards to the way it has
U.S. District Judge of Puerto Rico Salvador Casellas ex- treated Puerto Rico: “treat a nation like a ghetto and it will bepressed his indignation by asserting that “it shocks the con- have like a ghetto.”59
science to impose the ultimate penalty, death, upon American
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